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Disciplining Physicians
in Pennsylvania:




Recently, the professional lives of physicians practicing in Penn-
sylvania have been subject to increased scrutiny by the com-
monwealth.' An examination of the Index to Legal Periodicals,
however, revealed that the only commentary dealing with disciplinary
actions involving physicians was one casenote.2 In order to fill a part of
the void that exists in legal literature on the topic of medical
disciplinary actions, this article will analyze licensing problems in Penn-
sylvania arising from medicare fraud convictions!
*B.A., J.D., Duquesne University. Associate Professor of Law, Duquesne University
School of Law. The author serves as a part-time hearing examiner for the Pennsylvania
State Board of Medical Education and Licensure.
1. For example, the number of complaints in 1978 and 1979 were:
1978 1979
Active complaints 208 148
Processed complaints 208 404
TOTAL 416 552
Pennsylvania Dep't of State, Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs, State Bd. of
Medical Education & Licensure, Summary of Complaints (1978-1979). The total number of
actions in the years 1974 through 1977 were:
1974 1975 1976 1977
35 51 39 121
Pennsylvania Dep't of State, Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs, State Bd. of
Medical Education & Licensure, Summary of Disciplinary Actions (1974-1977).
2. 8 CUM. L. REv. 295 (1977) (discussed due process considerations concerning hear-
ing required before imposing disciplinary sanctions against a physician).
3. A medicare fraud conviction for purposes of this article is defined to include a
conviction under any or all of the following three federal laws: a) The Federal Fraud and
False Statements Statute, which provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry,
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One difficulty that first presented itself in the writing of this article
was the lack of a legal reference work on the development of the law
regarding licensing of physicians in Pennsylvania. In an effort to make
the discussion on the medicare conviction problems more facile and
understandable, the initial portion of the article will address the
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976); b) the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, which provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter,
give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit
or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be
or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose
of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post of-
fice or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such
matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direc-
tion thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to
whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976); and c) the Federal Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled
Act, which provides:
Whoever-
(1) knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made any false statement or
representation of a material fact in any application for any benefit or payment
under this subchapter,
(2) at any time knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made any false
statement or representation of a material fact for use in determining rights to any
such benefit or payment,
(3) having knowledge of the occurrence of any event affecting (A) his initial or
continued right to any such benefit or payment, or (B) the initial or continued right
to any such benefit or payment of any other individual in whose behalf he has ap-
plied for or is receiving such benefit or payment, conceals or fails to disclose such
event with an intent fraudulently to secure such benefit or payment either in a
greater amount or quantity than is due or when no such benefit or payment is
authorized, or
(4) having made application to receive any such benefit or payment for the use
and benefit of another and having received it, knowingly and willfully converts such
benefit or payment or any part thereof to a use other than for the use and benefit
of such other person,
shall (i) in the case of such a statement, representation, concealment, failure, or con-
version by any person in connection with the furnishing (by that person) of.items or
services for which payment is or may be made under this subchapter, be guilty of a
felony and upon conviction thereof fined not more $25,000 or imprisoned for not
more than five years or both, or (ii) in the case of such a statement, representation,
concealment, failure, or conversion by any other person, be guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction thereof fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both.
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (Supp. I 1977).
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history of the regulation of the practice of medicine in Pennsylvania.
The second part of the article will specifically concentrate on whether
medicare fraud convictions give rise to the possibility of the imposition
of disciplinary sanctions.'
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Under its police power a state regulates the right of physicians to
minister to the medical needs of people.' The state's authority is broad;
yet, it cannot act in an arbitrary fashion because of the physician's in-
terest in protecting his property-the medical license.' Thus, a state's
regulations are required to relate reasonably to the practice of
medicine and cannot be vague, indefinite or uncertain.'
4. The available disciplinary sanctions are set forth in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
421.15(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979):
(b) When the board finds that the license of any person may be refused,
revoked or suspended under the terms of subsection (a) above, the board may:
(1) Deny the application for a license.
(2) Administer a public or private reprimand.
(3) Revoke, suspend, limit, or otherwise restrict a license as determined by
the board.
(4) Require a licensee to submit to the care, counseling or treatment of a
physician or physicians designated by the board.
(5) Suspend enforcement of its finding thereof and place a licensee on proba-
tion with the right to vacate the probationary order for noncompliance.
(6) Restore or reissue, in its discretion, a license to practice medicine and
surgery, and may impose any disciplinary or corrective measure which it might
originally have imposed.
5. Barksy v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (upheld validity of state law
governing licensing of physician); Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1909) (Maryland law
requiring license to practice medicine and setting forth qualifications for physicians was
valid); Steinbach v. Metzger, 63 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1933) (Pennsylvania law which regulated
the practice of medicine was valid under the police power of the state); In re Campbell,
197 Pa. 581, 47 A. 860 (1901); Reisinger v. Commonwealth, 41 Pa. Commw. Ct. 553, 399
A.2d 1160 (1979). See Vodicka, Medical Discipline, 233 J.A.M.A. 1106 (1975).
6. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5 (1957) ("certainly,
the practice of law is not a matter of the State's grace"); In re Shigon, 462 Pa. 1, 329 A.2d
235 (1974) (right to practice law is a property right); Reisinger v. Commonwealth, 41 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 553, 399 A.2d 1160 (1979).
7. Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 P. 39 (1906) (since license
to practice medicine is a valuable property right, regulations providing authority for the
revocation of license must be certain and definite); Rogers v. State Bd. of Medical Ex-
aminers, 371 So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ("The legislature has a right to
prescribe reasonable rules and regulations that shall control the practice of medicine.
[citation omitted] Such authority is, however, limited in that such rules and regulations
must bear a reasonable relationship to the public safety, health, morals and general
welfare."); Oliver v. Commonwealth, 45 Pa. Commw. Ct. 195, 197, 404 A.2d 1386, 1387
(1979) (regulation of practice of psychology valid if there is "direct, substantial, and
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The actual regulation of the practice of medicine by the com-
monwealth in Pennsylvania began during the mid-nineteenth century.8
Initially, the practice of medicine was regulated on a county-by-county
basis.9 The earliest requirements specified that the physician had to be
"regularly graduated."" There were exceptions for physicians, similar
to exceptions that existed for lawyers," who were not graduates of a
medical school but who had been in regular practice for a number of
years or who had read medicine under the guidance of another physi-
cian.'" Practicing medicine without first meeting the requirements to
practice medicine constituted a misdemeanor, which was punishable by
fine 3 and at a later date, was also punishable by imprisonment." In
1875, the commonwealth began regulating the practice of medicine on a
statewide basis."
The first time a physician was required to pass an examination was
in 1893.16 Upon passing the examination the physician was entitled to a
license. 7 The commonwealth, however, did not otherwise regulate a
physician's conduct subsequent to the issuance of a license. In 1911,
Pennsylvania rectified that omission by creating the Bureau of Medical
Education and Licensure 8 and authorizing it to:
refuse, revoke, or suspend the right to practice medicine or surgery in
[Pennsylvania] for any or all of the following reasons, to wit: The convic-
tion of a crime involving moral turpitude, habitual intemperance in the
reasonable relationship to the practice of psychology"). See Vodicka, Medical Discipline,
233 J.A.M.A. 1427 (1975).
8. The first statute regulating the practice of medicine was passed in 1866. Act of
April 11, 1866, No. 666, § 1, 1866 Pa. Laws 679 (repealed 1870). See Alderfer, Legislative
History of Medical Licensing in Pennsylvania, 1961 PA. MED. J. 1605.
9. E.g., Act of April 7, 1873, No. 575, § 1, 1873 Pa. Laws 550 (repealed 1875) (Mercer
County); Act of March 23, 1872, No. 506, §§ 1-3, 1872 Pa. Laws 542 (repealed 1875) (Butler
County); Act of April 15, 1869, No. 1057, §§ 1-3, 1869 Pa. Laws 1067 (repealed 1875) (coun-
ties of York, Indiana, Perry, Juniata, Adams, Bucks, Northampton, Lehigh and Elk).
10. Act of April 11, 1866, No. 666, § 1, 1866 Pa. Laws 679 (repealed 1870).
11. See Lefever. Reflections on the Pennsylvania System of Admissions to the Bar,
23 PA. B.A.Q. 142 (1952).
12. E.g., Act of March 31, 1870, No. 657, § 1, 1870 Pa. Laws 705 (repealed 1875); Act
of April 15, 1869, No. 1057, § 1, 1869 Pa. Laws 1067 (repealed 1875).
13. Act of April 11, 1866, No. 666, § 1, 1866 Pa. Laws 679 (repealed 1870).
14. Act of March 31, 1870, No. 642, § 1, 1870 Pa. Laws 690 (repealed 1875).
15. Act of April 12, 1875, No. 55, §§ 1-6, 1875 Pa. Laws 51 (repealed 1877) (required,
inter alia, good moral character and registration with prothonotary in county in which
physician practiced).
16. Act of May 18, 1893, No. 52, §§ 13-14, 1893 Pa. Laws 94 (repealed 1911) (also
established a Medical Council and three State Boards of Medical Examiners, the precur-
sors of the present State Board of Medical Education and Licensure).
17. Id. § 12.
18. Act of June 3, 1911, No. 639, § 2, 1911 Pa. Laws 639, 640 (repealed 1974).
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use of ardent spirits or stimulants, narcotics, or any other substance
which impairs intellect and judgment to such an extent as to incapacitate
for the performance of professional duties.'
Under that provision, chiropractors brought one of the earliest
challenges to the commonwealth's right to regulate the practice of
medicine. They argued that the licensing act in effect at that time
deprived them of their ability to practice chiropractic because the act
did not contain provisions for the licensing of chiropractors." They
claimed that their constitutional rights were invaded because they
were deprived of their property without due process of law, they were
being denied the equal protection of the laws and their privileges and
immunities were abridged. The federal court which considered those
issues held that the commonwealth was acting within its police power
and accordingly, the chiropractors' federal constitutional rights were
not invaded.21 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously con-
strued the act to require chiropractors to be licensed physicians' and
the federal court was therefore without ability to aid the chiroprac-
tors.
The next major revision concerning the disciplining of physicians
after licensure was in 1935 when the 1911 law was amended to provide
for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for:
The conviction in a state or Federal court of a crime involving moral tur-
pitude, habitual intemperance in the use of ardent spirits or stimulants,
narcotics, or any other substance or any condition which impairs intellect
and judgment to such an extent as to incapacitate for the performance or
[sic] professional duties, the board may so act upon satisfactory proof of
grossly unethical practice, or of any form of pretense which might induce
citizens to become prey to professional exploitation."
In 1963 the provision regulating a physican's conduct after licensure
was again amended and made somewhat more explicit. A physician
was subject to disciplinary sanctions:
Upon entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or being found guilty in
19. 1d § 12.
20. Steinbach v. Metzger, 63 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1933) (state did not act unreasonably by
requiring that chiropractors be licensed physicians).
21. Id. at 76. The court held that state law which had the effect of requiring all
chiropractors to be physicians was valid since it comported with policy under police power
of assuring people of "skilled treatment of their ills." Id.
22. Long v. Metzger, 301 Pa. 449, 152 A. 572 (1930) (state law regulating practice of
medicine was constitutional even though it required chiropractors to be physicians); Com-
monwealth v. Seibert, 262 Pa. 345, 105 A. 507 (1918) (state law regulating practice of
medicine held constitutional despite claim of neuropath who was precluded from practic-
ing his profession because of it).
23. Act of July 19, 1935, No. 417, § 12, 1935 Pa. Laws 1329, 1334 (repealed 1974).
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a state or Federal court of a crime involving moral turpitude, habitual in-
temperance in the use of ardent spirits or stimulants, narcotics or other
habit-forming drugs, or any other substance or any condition which im-
pairs intellect and judgment to such an extent as to incapacitate for the
performance of professional duties. The board may so act upon satisfac-
tory proof of grossly unethical practice, or of any form of pretense which
might induce persons to become a prey to professional exploitation or for
violation of the rules and regulations of the board.u
The applicable law governing the authority of the State Board of
Medical Education and Licensure25 to oversee the conduct of physicians
after licensure today is the Medical Practice Act of 1974. That act ex-
panded the coverage of the regulation of a physician's professional con-
duct by setting forth eight provisions which would permit the State
Board of Medical Education and Licensure to take action against a
physician's license." In general, the provisions reflect a concern with a
24. Act of August 14, 1963, No. 440, sec. 10, § 12, 1963 Pa. Laws 957, 968 (repealed
1974).
25. The State Board of Medical Education and Licensure was established in 1929. Act
of April 9, 1929, No. 175, § 412, 1929 Pa. Laws 177, 205 (current version at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 122 (Purdon Supp. 1979)).
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 421.1-.18 (Purdon Supp. 1979)).
27. The act provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) The board shall have authority to refuse, revoke or suspend the license of a
physician for any or all of the following reasons:
(1) Failing to demonstrate the qualifications or standards for a license contained
in this act or regulations of the board.
(2) Making misleading, deceptive, untrue or fraudulent representations in the
practice of medicine; practicing fraud or deceit in obtaining a license to practice
medicine and surgery; or making a false or deceptive biennial registration with the
board.
(3) Being convicted of a felony in the courts of this Commonwealth or any other
state, territory or country. Conviction as used in this paragraph shall include a find-
ing or verdict of guilt, an admission of guilt, or a plea of nolo contendere.
(4) Having his license to practice medicine and surgery revoked or suspended or
having other disciplinary action taken, or his application for a license refused,
revoked or suspended by the proper licensing authority of another state, territory
or country.
(5) Being unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients
by reason of illness, drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, narcotics, chemicals, or
any other type of material, or as a result of any mental or physical condition.
In enforcing this clause (5), the board shall, upon probable cause, have authority
to compel a physician to submit to a mental or physical examination by physicians
designated by it. Failure of a physician to submit to such an examination when
directed shall constitute an admission of the allegations against him unless failure is
due to circumstances beyond his control, consequent upon which a default and final
order may be entered without the taking of testimony or presentation of evidence.
A physician affected under this paragraph shall at reasonable intervals be afforded
an opportunity to demonstrate that he can resume a competent practice of medicine
with reasonable skill and safety to patients.
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physician's competency' and ethical fiber."
A little over a year after the enactment of the Medical Practice Act,
the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Health Care Services Malprac-
tice Act' which essentially set up a system designed to make profes-
sional liability insurance available to physicians at reasonable cost.3 1 As
part of the Health Care Services Malpractice Act, the legislature
established mechanisms to fully implement the authority of the State
Board of Medical Education and Licensure to deal with problems
relating to the regulation of the practice of medicine.' The act pro-
vided for the hiring of investigators and attorneys' and also established
a panel of hearing examiners to conduct the disciplinary hearings.3
The hearing examiner's decision is final," subject to a right of appeal
to the State Board of Medical Education and Licensure." A further
right of appeal lies from the decision of the State Board of Medical
Education and Licensure to the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania. 7
After reviewing the statutory provisions governing the physician's
right to practice medicine, it is necessary to consider the form of
enforcing the commonwealth's proscriptions -the disciplinary pro-
(6) Violating a lawful regulation promulgated by the board or violating a lawful
order of the board, previously entered by the board in a disciplinary proceeding.
(7) Knowingly maintaining a professional connection or association with any per-
son who is in violation of this act or regulations of the board or knowingly aiding,
assisting, procuring or advising any unlicensed person to practice medicine contrary
to this act, or regulations of the board.
(8) Being guilty of immoral or unprofessional conduct. Unprofessional conduct
shall include any departure from, or the failure to conform to, the standards of ac-
ceptable and prevailing medical practice, in which proceeding actual injury to a pa-
tient need not be established.
Id § 421.15(a). Subsections 2, 3 and 8, quoted above, are relevant to the problems raised
in the second portion of this article concerning medicare fraud convictions.
28. Id. §§ 421.15(aXl), (4), (5), (8).
29. Id §§ 421.15(a)(2), (3), (7).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.101-.1006 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
31. Id § 1301.102. In order to effectuate the system, the act requires mandatory in-
surance. Id § 1301.701(a). That requirement was held to be constitutionally permissible in
McCoy v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 530, 391 A.2d 723 (1978).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.901-.907 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
33. Id. § 1301.901.
34. Id. § 1301.902 (hearing examiners are appointed by the State Board of Medical
Education and Licensure with the approval of the governor).
35. Id. § 1301.903.
36. Id § 1301.905 (application for review must be made within twenty days from deci-
sion of hearing examiner and State Board of Medical Education and Licensure may hear
arguments and additional evidence).
37. Id § 1301.906.
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ceeding." The most frustrating aspect of dealing with disciplinary pro-
ceedings is that they are unique." They are neither necessarily
criminal nor civil in nature, although some courts have labeled them
"quasi-criminal." ' Thus, it is difficult to know whether a given problem
should be considered in light of cases dealing with criminal law or
should be based on considerations arising out of civil disputes. The
reason disciplinary proceedings involve criminal considerations is that
disciplinary sanctions have the effect of depriving the physician of the
ability to earn a living-a property right-and therefore may be
viewed as civil penalties." The civil aspect involved in a disciplinary
proceeding is that a purpose of the proceeding is to protect the public
from incompetent, unqualified and unethical physicians and accord-
ingly, the sanctions are not perceived as punishing the physician but as
protecting the public.'"
38. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 421.15(c) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
39. In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 1970) ("disbarment and suspension pro-
ceedings are neither civil nor criminal in nature but are special proceedings, sui generis");
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 463 Pa. 472, 345 A.2d 616 (1975) (disciplinary
proceeding commenced against an attorney after acquittal on criminal charges arising
from the same conduct held not to violate double jeopardy clause of fifth amendment to
United States Constitution).
40. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) ("These [disbarment proceedings] are adver-
sary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature"); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell,
463 Pa. 472, 345 A.2d 616 (1975). Contra, Younge v. State Bd. of Registration for the Heal-
ing Arts, 451 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1018 (1970).
41. In Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination was applicable in a disciplinary proceeding
brought against an attorney. The Court stated:
The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, professional reputa-
tion, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish
the privilege. That threat is indeed as powerful an instrument of complusion as
"the use of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individual the
evidence necessary to convict him ...."
Id. at 516. See, e.g., Lester v. Department of Professional & Occupational Regs., 348 So.
2d 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); In re Wolfe, 160 N.J. Super. 114, 388 A.2d 1316 (1978)
(disciplinary sanctions are civil penalties); In re Shigon, 462 Pa. 1, 329 A.2d 235 (1974)
(disciplinary sanction of disbarment is a punishment or penalty); Schireson v. Shafer, 354
Pa. 458, 47 A.2d 665 (1946) (legislation regulating practice of medicine is penal in nature);
Boyd v. Commonwealth, 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 620, 317 A.2d 307 (1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 993 (1975) (law regulating practice of osteopaths is a penal statute); Korndorffer v.
Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 448 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (license to
practice medicine is property right and law providing authority to revoke license is highly
penal).
42. See Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 73 n.6, 435 P.2d 553, 558
n.6, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785, 790 n.6. ("purpose of an action seeking revocation of a doctor's cer-
tificate is not to punish the doctor but rather to protect the public"); Dean v. State, 233
Ind. 25, 116 N.E.2d 503, 505 (1954) ("purpose . . . is to protect people afflicted with disease
or illness in any degree from their own incredulity"); Younge v. State Bd. of Registration
Vo1.18:521
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It appears, therefore, that there are two competing interests in-
volved in a disciplinary proceeding-the interest of the physician in
protecting his ability to practice medicine and the interest of the
public in insuring that physicians are competent, qualified and ethical.
In some circumstances, a tribunal must choose between these in-
terests."3 Essentially a balancing process is involved in determining
under what circumstances the physician's interest should be protected
over the public's interest and alternatively, under what circumstances
the public's interest needs to be protected over the physician's in-
terest; for example, the standard of proof applicable in a disciplinary
proceeding has been weighed in favor of the public interest." The
standard of proof is a civil standard which permits the imposition of a
disciplinary sanction if a violation of the Medical Practice Act has been
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence. 5 This contrasts to a
criminal standard of proof which would have protected the physician
by requiring that proof beyond a reasonable doubt be established prior
to the imposition of sanctions." In contrast, the physician's interest has
for the Healing Arts, 451 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Mo. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1018 (1970)
("These revocation proceedings are not penal, they are not 'quasi-criminal,' they do not
contemplate 'punitive' sanctions and the provisions against double jeopardy do not
apply"); State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Macy, 92 Wash. 614, 159 P. 801 (1916) (law
regulating physician's profession was not a criminal statute).
43. For example, if the physician's interest against self-incrimination means that he
cannot be compelled to testify concerning the charges against him, the public interest may
be jeopardized because of an inability of the state to obtain facts requisite to a finding of
professional misbehavior. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 520, 530 (1966) (4-1-4 deci-
sion) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Today's application of the privilege serves only to hamper
appropriate protection of other fundamental public values"). See also Vodicka, Medical
Discipline, 234 J.A.M.A. 1062 (1975).
44. See, e.g., Mack v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 430 F.2d 862, 863 (5th Cir. 1970),
cer. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971) ("Board in proceeding to revoke a professional license was
not limited to evidence beyond a reasonable doubt"). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Berlant Appeal, 458 Pa. 439, 328 A.2d 471 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975), stated:
While we recognize the severe impact that such sanctions [censure, suspension or
disbarment] may have on an individual's career, we are also mindful of our duty to
uphold the quality and integrity of the Bar. Accordingly, we shall not require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, but shall retain the standard this Court has consistently
utilized in disciplinary cases through the years: "that a preponderance of evidence
is necessary to establish an attorney's unprofessional conduct and the proof of such
conduct must be clear and satisfactory."
I&. at 441, 328 A.2d at 473. See State Bd. of Osteopathic Examiners v. Berberian, 200 Pa.
Super. Ct. 533, 190 A.2d 330 (1963). See also Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v.
Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 869 (Colo. 1979) (general statute of limitations not applicable to
disciplinary proceedings).
45. See, e.g., Mack v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Berlant Appeal, 458 Pa. 439, 328 A.2d 471 (1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975).
46. See the example discussed at note 43 supra.
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been protected in disciplinary proceedings by entitling him to assert
the privilege against self-incrimination.47
One problem over which state court decisions are in conflict is
whether the law regulating the right to practice a profession should be
liberally or strictly construed. If the legislation is viewed as penal in
nature because of the potential impact upon the physician, it will be
subject to strict construction against the state. 8 If, however, the state
places paramount emphasis upon protecting the public, the legislation
will be subject to liberal construction."9 Pennsylvania follows those
jurisdictions which strictly construe the legislation,5" a practice which
engenders difficult problems of statutory interpretation. 1
47. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1966).
48. E.g., Lester v. Department of Professional & Occupational Regs., 348 So. 2d 923
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (Florida Medical Practice Act is a penal statute and must be
strictly construed); In re Wolfe, 160 N.J. Super. 114, 388 A.2d 1316 (1978) (New Jersey
Medical Practice Act provides for civil penalties and therefore must be strictly construed);
Shireson v. Shafer, 354 Pa. 458, 461-62, 47 A.2d 665, 667 (1946) (legislation authorizing
State Board of Medical Education & Licensure to revoke a license is "penal in nature and
must be strictly construed"); Boyd v. Commonwealth, 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 620, 317 A.2d
307 (1947), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1975) (legislation authorizing suspension of
osteopath's license is penal and subject to strict construction); State Bd. of Osteopathic
Examiners v. Berberian, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 553, 190 A.2d 330 (1963) (term "unethical con-
duct" in statute authorizing suspension of osteopath's license was strictly construed);
Korndorffer v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 448 S.W.2d 819, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969) ("[Statute authorizing revocation of a license to practice medicine must be strictly
followed since the statutes are highly penal. They must be construed in the physician's
favor, if possible."). Cf. Vodicka, Medical Discipline, 235 J.A.M.A. 302 (1976) (medical
disciplinary provisions are not penal but are nonetheless subject to strict construction by
reason of property right inherent in license).
49. See, e.g., Younge v. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts, 451 S.W.2d
346 (Mo. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1018 (1970); Dean v. State ex rel Board of Medical
Registration & Examination, 233 Ind. 25, 116 N.E.2d 503, 505 (1954) ("The Medical Prac-
tice Act is clearly not a criminal statute and the rules pertaining to criminal statutes
which appellant here asserts have no application to the case at bar."); Hughes v. State Bd.
of Health, 348 Mo. 1236, 159 S.W.2d 277 (1942) (stated that a 1913 decision by that court
which held the medical disciplinary act to be penal and subject to strict construction
against the state had been overruled); State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Macy, 92 Wash.
614, 159 P. 801 (1916) (medical disciplinary law was not criminal statute).
50. Schireson v. Shafer, 354 Pa. 458, 47 A.2d 665 (1946); State Bd. of Osteopathic Ex-
aminers v. Berberian, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 533, 190 A.2d 330 (1963); Boyd v. Commonwealth,
12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 620, 317 A.2d 307 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1975). The
legislature has specified what rules of construction are to be applied when construing
statutes. If the provisions are penal they are to be strictly construed. 1 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1928(b)(1) (Purdon 1973). If section 421.15(a) of the Medical Practice Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 421.15(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979), is not a penal provision, however, it would be
"liberally construed to effect [its] objects and to promote justice." 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1928(a) (Purdon 1973).
51. The discussion in Part II-A, infra, concerning the interpretation of the term
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The conduct involved in the disciplinary complaints brought in re-
cent years under the Pennsylvania Medical Practice Act52 ranges from
a failure to obtain mandatory medical malpractice insurance as re-
quired by the Health Care Services Malpractice Act' to gross in-
competence." It would be impossible to thoroughly analyze and con-
sider the legal problems arising from such a variety of conduct in the
space available in this article. Thus, the focus of the second portion of
this paper will be upon certain problems that arise in a disciplinary ac-
tion initiated by reason of a conviction of medicare fraud.
II. MEDICARE FRAUD CONVICTIONS
A conviction of medicare fraud may subject a physician to
disciplinary action under three provisions of the Medical Practice Act.
The physician's license may be in jeopardy if such a conviction is a
felony,55 is the result of misleading, deceptive, untrue or fraudulent
representations in the practice of medicine, ' or results from immoral
or unprofessional conduct."' Those problems will be examined in
seriatim.
A. Felony Under Pennsylvania Law
The Pennsylvania Medical Practice Act" provides that a physician
may be subject to discipline if he has been "convicted of a felony in the
courts of this Commonwealth or any other state, territory, or
country."5 The power of a state to impose disciplinary sanctions for
convictions of crimes was addressed by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Barsky v. Board of Regents." There, the Supreme
Court discussed the appropriateness of disciplining a physician who
had been convicted of a misdemeanor in federal court for failing to pro-
duce papers subpoenaed by a congressional committee. The applicable
"felony," illustrates a problem of statutory interpretation arising from the application of
the rule of strict construction.
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 421.15 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.701 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
54. E.g., Pa. Dep't of State Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs, State Bd.
of Medical Education & Licensure, Summary of Complaints (1979) (other subjects of com-
plaints included disciplinary sanctions imposed by other states, personal use of drugs,
psychiatric problems, drug law violations, etc.).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 421.15(a)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
56. Id § 421.15(a)(2).
57. Id. § 421.15(a)(8).
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 421.1 -.18 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
59. Id § 421.1(a)(3).
60. 347 U.S. 442 (1953) (6-3 decision).
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state law provided that a physician could be subject to discipline upon
being "convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction, either within or
without this state, of a crime.""1 The Supreme Court found that the
state under its police power was able to take action against a physi-
cian's license for a misdemeanor conviction even if it did not involve
moral turpitude and even though that conduct would not have been
criminal under the state's law. 2
The state was able to proceed against a physician for conviction of a
crime no matter how minor because of its interest in protecting the
standards of character and law observance required of physicians.
Such a broad power, when enforced, did not deprive the physician of
his property rights or due process of law. The Court, however, noted
that it was relevant that the state did not automatically impose a sanc-
tion, but was able to determine the measured discipline on an ad hoc
basis." Thus, at least under the federal constitution a state may ap-
propriately impose disciplinary sanctions based upon the conviction of
a crime whether or not that crime is of a serious nature and whether
61. Id. at 446.
62. The current version of the New York law provides:
Each of the following is professional misconduct, and any licensee found guilty
of such misconduct under the procedures prescribed in section sixty-five hundred
ten shall be subject to the penalties prescribed in section sixty-five hundred eleven:
(5) Being convicted of committing an act constituting a crime under;
(a) New York State law or,
(b) Federal law or,
(c) The law of another jurisdiction and which, if committed within this state,
would have constituted a crime under New York state law.
N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 6509 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1979). Thus, the difference between the
current law and the law applicable in Barsky is that under the current law, if one had
been convicted of a rime in another state which would not have amounted to a crime in
New York, that conviction would not be considered professional misconduct. Of interest to
this issue is a decision which held that a conviction of medicare fraud is professional
misconduct under the current New York law quoted above. Mosner v. Ambach, 66 App.
Div. 2d 912, 410 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1978).
63. 347 U.S. at 452. The Court stated:
This statute is readily distinguishable from one which would require the
automatic termination of a professional license because of some criminal conviction
of its holder. Realizing the importance of high standards of character and law obser-
vance on the part of practicing physicians, the State has adopted a flexible pro-
cedure to protect the public against the practice of medicine by those convicted of
many more kinds and degrees of crime than it can well list specifically. It accord-
ingly has sought to attain its justifiable end by making the conviction of any crime
a violation of its professional medical standards, and then leaving it to a qualified
board of doctors to determine initially the measure of discipline to be applied to the
offending practitioner.
Id. at 452 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
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or not that crime was based upon conduct which occurred in the prac-
tice of medicine."
Although Pennsylvania, at least under the Federal Constitution,
would be entitled to subject physicians who had been convicted of a
crime, no matter how serious, to the disciplinary process, it has not
chosen to do so. The only kind of conviction sanctionable under the
Medical Practice Act is a felony. There is no statutory interpretation
problem if the physician has been convicted of a felony by a Penn-
sylvania court. That would be a clear violation of the Medical Practice
Act. There, however, is an interpretation issue when the criminal con-
viction arises in another jurisdiction. Under that circumstance, there
are at least two possible interpretations of the term "felony." It might
be interpreted to refer only to a conviction in another jurisdiction
which would be viewed as a felony under Pennsylvania law. Alter-
natively, the term "felony" may be interpreted to refer to a conviction
resulting from a felony as defined by the jurisdiction which imposed
the conviction."
64. Cf. Durante v. Board of Regents, 70 App. Div. 2d 692, 416 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1979), in
which a nurse's license was suspended for a violation of N.Y. EDUc. LAW. § 6509(5) (McKin-
ney Cum. Supp. 1979) (the same section is applicable to physicians) even though the con-
victions for obtaining marijuana without having paid the applicable transfer tax, for smug-
gling marijuana into the United States and for attempted criminal possession of a weapon
conceivably did not arise from conduct related to the practice of his profession.
65. See In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 26 N.E.2d 260 (1940). Donegan involved the con-
struction of a statute requiring disbarment of an attorney upon his being convicted of a
felony. The attorney in question had been convicted of a federal felony which would only
have amounted to a misdemeanor under New York law. The court stated that the
disciplinary statute was:
ambiguous as to the following three situations: (1) Where an offense is a felony
under federal law and also a felony under the New York law; (2) where an offense is
a felony under federal law but is a crime less than a felony in this State; (3) where
an offense is a felony solely under Federal law and is not cognizable at all under
our laws.
A. at 290-91, 26 N.E.2d at 262. The Donegan court held that given the application of the
rule of strict construction, the term "felony" encompassed only federal felonies which
would amount to felonies under New York law; since there was no analogous New York
felony the attorney was not automatically disbarred. The dissent noted that even though
there was not an analogous New York felony in terms of the elements of the offense, the
potential punishment for the federal felony, conspiracy to use the mails to promote frauds,
was sufficient under New York law to have constituted the crime a felony. Id. at 293, 26
N.E.2d at 264. Apparently, therefore, there may also be divergent considerations as to
whether one should consider the elements of the offense or the potential punishment for
the offense in determining when a conviction of a felony in another jurisdiction would
amount to a felony under the state law.
New York recently changed its attitude towards the interpretation to be given the
term "felony" in the disciplinary provision affecting attorneys. In Chu v. Association of
the Bar, 42 N.Y.2d 490, 369 N.E.2d 1, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1977), the court held that an at-
torney was automatically disbarred for a conviction of a mail fraud and noted that
1980
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The statutory interpretation problem is significant in situations
where medicare fraud convictions are involved because, in Penn-
sylvania, if a physician engaged in conduct similar to that required for
a medicare fraud conviction under the federal law, he would not be
guilty of a felony. The lowest degree of felony in Pennsylvania is
felony of the third degree and it is classified as such "if it is so
designated in this title or if a person convicted thereof may be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment, the maximum of which is not more
than seven years."" A felony under federal law, however is "[any of-
fense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year."67 An examination of the potential sentence involved in any of
the medicare fraud crimes reveals that five years is the maximum
term of imprisonment." Under Pennsylvania law, that term of im-
Donegan was not controlling: "[W]e now perceive little or no reason for distinguishing be-
tween conviction of a Federal felony and conviction of a New York State felony as a
predicate for professional discipline. Certainly this is so when, as here, there is a New
York State felony of substantially the same elements." Id. at 494, 369 N.E.2d at 3, 398
N.Y.S.2d at 1003 (footnote ommited). See In re Thies, 45 N.Y.2d 865, 866, 382 N.E.2d 1351,
410 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (1978) (upheld automatic disbarment for federal felony conviction,
stating that "it is immaterial that there is no felony analogue under our State statutes
matching the Federal felony").
One reason the recent New York decisions may not be applicable to the issues raised
under Pennsylvania law is that the New York change is based upon policy favoring the
protection of the public's interest, which apparently overrides the applicability of the
strict construction rule. Missouri is another jurisdiction which has abrogated the ap-
plicability of the rule of strict construction to disciplinary statutes. Compare Younge v.
State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts, 451 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. 1969), cert denied,
397 U.S. 1018 (1970) with State ex reL Spriggs v. Robinson, 253 Mo. 271, 161 S.W. 1169
(1913) (overruled in State ex reL Lentine v. State Bd. of Health, 334 Mo. 220, 65 S.W.2d
943 (1933)). Thus, in a jurisdiction which adheres to the rule of strict construction for
disciplinary statutes the Donegan result may still be warranted.
Additionally, as noted in the dissent in Donegan, if a "felony" is defined by considering
the potential punishment, a federal felony would amount to a New York state felony.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1976) (felony is "[a]ny offense punishable by death or imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year") with N.Y. PENAL LAw § 10(5) (McKinney 1975)
("'Felony' means an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of
one year may be imposed"). See also In re Minner, 133 Kan. 789, 3 P.2d 473 (1931)
("felony" depends on punishment prescribed); Mingo Co. Medical Soc'y v. Simon, 124 W.
Va. 493, 20 S.E.2d 807 (1942) (whether an offense is a felony is determined by the punish-
ment). As discussed at notes 66-74 and accompanying text infra, Pennsylvania probably
would not classify a medicare fraud conviction as a felony on either the elements of the of-
fense or the nature of the potential punishment. Thus the recent New York decisions may
not be directly applicable when interpreting the Pennsylvania disciplinary statute.
66. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 106 (Purdon 1973).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) (not more than five years); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) (not
more than five years); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (Supp. 1 1977) (not more than five years).
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prisonment would classify the crime as a misdemeanor of the first
degree 9 rather than as a felony.
Therefore, Pennsylvania differs from the federal government
because it views a felony as a more serious offense."' Additionally, the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code, which classified the lowest degree of felony
as the conviction of a crime with the potential maximum punishment of
a term of imprisonment of seven years, was in existence at the time
the Medical Practice Act of 1974 was passed71 and accordingly, the
legislature should have been aware that Pennsylvania considered a
felony to be a serious offense and differentiated between various
degrees of felonies as well as between various degrees of misde-
meanors.
7 2
If one considers the actual elements of the crime instead of the
potential punishment, the Pennsylvania crime most analogous to the
federal medicare fraud crimes is the crime of unsworn falsification to
authorities, which is a misdemeanor of the second degree."' A convic-
69. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 106(b)(6) (Purdon 1973) provides: "A crime is a misde-
meanor of the first degree if it is so designated in this title or if a person convicted
thereof may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the maximum of which is not more
than five years."
70. That is evidenced by the Pennsylvania specification that the lowest class of
felonies reaches crimes which carry a potential punishment of not more than seven years.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 106 (Purdon 1973). See generally Jerome v. United States, 318
U.S. 101, 106-07 (1913), wherein the court defined the term "felony" as used in a federal
statute to include only federal felonies and stated:
Moreover, the difficulty of giving "felony" in [the federal law] a state law meaning
is emphasized when we turn to the law of such a state as New Jersey. There we
find crimes classified as "misdemeanors" and "high misdemeanors" .. . . The in-
ference is strong that if Congress had designed [the federal law] to include the
more serious state offenses . . . it would have used language which would have af-
forded that protection in all states.
71. The Crimes Code was enacted in 1972, Act of December 6, 1972, No. 334, § 1,
1972 Vol. II Pa. Laws 1482 (codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 106 (Purdon 1973)). The
provision of the Medical Practice Act which refers to "felony" was enacted in 1974, Act of
July 20, 1974, No. 190, § 15, 1974 Pa. Laws 551 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 421.15
(Purdon Supp. 1979)).
72. Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 106(b)(2) (Purdon 1973) (felony of the first
degree) with id. § 106(b)(4) (felony of the third degree) and id. § 106(b)(6) (misdemeanor of
the first degree) with id. § 106(b)(8) (misdemeanor of the third degree).
73. Section 4904 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides:
(a) In general. - A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with
intent to mislead a public servant in performing his official function, he:
(1) makes any written false statement which he does not believe to be true;
(2) submits or invites reliance on any writing which he knows to be forged,
altered or otherwise lacking in authenticity; or
(3) submits or invites reliance on any sample, specimen, map, boundary mark,
or other object which he knows to be false.
(b) Statements "under penalty." - A person commits a misdemeanor of the third
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tion of the most analogous Pennsylvania crime, since it is not a felony,
would not be a violation of the provision of the Medical Practice Act
permitting action against a physician's license for conviction of a
felony." Accordingly, whether one examines the punishment or the
degree if he makes a written false statement which he does not believe to be true,
on or pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false
statements made therein are punishable.
(c) Perjury provisions applicable.- Section 4902(c) through (f) of this title
(relating to perjury) applies to this section.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4904 (Purdon 1973). Cf Commonwealth v. Mascaro, 394 A.2d 998
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1978), in which the court held that state prosecution of a defendant under,
inter alia, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4904 (Purdon 1973), was barred by a prior conviction
in federal court for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1341 (1976), because both the state and
the federal statutes were "designed to guard against theft and fraud ... [and] to protect a
similar governmental interest." 394 A.2d at 1001-02.
74. But see Grounds for Complaints, 49 Pa. Code § 17.251(a)(4) (1979), which provides
in pertinent part:
(a) A complaint against a physician must allege that a licensee is practicing
medicine in violation of law, regulation, or good and acceptable medical practice.
Such grounds include those specifically enumerated in section 13 of the Act (63 P.S.
§ 421.15). The term unprofessional conduct shall include, but is not limited to, the
following:
(4) Conviction of a felony, defined as such under the laws of this Com-
monwealth, or under the laws of any other state, territory, or country.
Section 17.251(a)(4) indicates that if a physician has been convicted of a federal felony
whether or not that amounts to a Pennsylvania felony, that physician has engaged in un-
professional conduct which is subject to sanctions by reason of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
421.15(a)(8) (Purdon Supp. 1979) (provides that disciplinary sanctions may be imposed if
physician is guilty of immoral or unprofessional conduct). An interesting problem raised
by the regulation's interpretation of the term "unprofessional conduct" is whether the
State Board of Medical Education and Licensure exceeded its power. It is fundamental
that a court will enforce an administrative regulation only insofar as that regulation is
consistent with the statute under which it was promulgated. See Lumadue v. Com-
monwealth, 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 428, 391 A.2d 22 (1978) (Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare regulation, which required a claimant to seek employment in order to
qualify for assistance, was ruled to be invalid since it was inconsistent with the statutory
standard, which required only that a claimant accept work). If the Medical Practice Act
refers only to felonies as determined under Pennsylvania law, the State Board of Medical
Education and Licensure would be imposing an inconsistent requirement on physicians by
seeking through a definition of "unprofessional conduct" to encompass criminal convictions
which the legislature did not intend to be actionable under the disciplinary provisions. Cf.
Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, 388 Pa. 444, 462, 130 A.2d 686, 695 (1957) (reversed
Pennsylvania Department of Banking preclusion of a merger of two banks because the
agency exercised "powers beyond those granted or possessed"). See also Commonwealth
v. DiMeglio, 385 Pa. 119, 122 A.2d 77 (1956), in which the court held invalid a Penn-
sylvania Department of Argriculture regulation requiring all baking products to be free
from "added color" because it went further than the statutory norms: "The power of an
administrative agency to prescribe rules and regulations under a statute is not the power
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conduct involved, Pennsylvania would not consider a conviction of
medicare fraud to be a felony under Pennsylvania law.
A review of prior Pennsylvania laws regulating the practice of
medicine reveals that prior to 1974, the state subjected physicians to
discipline for conviction of crimes involving moral turpitude .7  There
was no limitation in the law requiring the crime to be a felony. A con-
viction for medicare fraud has been held to be a crime involving moral
turpitude." Thus, if a physician had been convicted of medicare fraud
by a federal court prior to 1974, he would have been subject to sanc-
tioning under the provisions of the law then in force.
That the legislature was aware of the differences between convic-
tions of crimes involving moral turpitude and convictions of felonies
and that it knows how to differentiate the two is made clear by the
statutory provisions applicable to osteopaths, which were adopted in
1978." Those provisions provide that an osteopath may be subject to
disciplinary action upon the "[cjonviction of a felony, a crime involving
moral turpitude, or a crime related to the practice of osteopathic
medicine." '78 The inference which arises from the reference to the term
"felony" as differentiated from the term "crime" is that Pennsylvania
intended to subject a physician's license to the sanctioning power of
the state only for felonies and not for other offenses which might be
viewed as serious convictions because the crimes involve moral tur-
pitude. Therefore, since Pennsylvania, unlike the federal government,
would not view a medicare fraud conviction as a felony, it arguably
would not be in accordance with the policy of Pennsylvania to impose
disciplinary sanctions for that kind of conviction.
Given the application of the rule of strict construction, the language
of the act, if it is subject to differing interpretations, must be inter-
to make law, but only the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of the
Legislature as expressed by the statute." Il at 124, 122 A.2d at 80.
-75. E.g., Act of August 14, 1963, No. 440, sec. 10, § 12, 1963 Pa. Laws 957, 968 (re-
pealed 1974); Act of June 3, 1911, No. 639, § 2, 1911 Pa. Laws 639, 640 (amended 1963 and
repealed 1974).
76. Yurick v. Commonwealth, 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 248, 402 A.2d 290 (1979). In Yurick,
an osteopath who had been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) (mail fraud) was held
to be properly sanctioned under a statute authorizing disciplinary action for conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude. The court stated: "It is .. .beyond doubt that [the
osteopath's] conviction for using the mails to defraud is a crime involving moral
turpitude." Id at 251, 402 A.2d at 292. See also Goodman v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 380, 400 A.2d 939 (1979) (osteopath's convictions, inter alia, under 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (Supp. I 1977), subjected him to the disciplinary power of
the State Board of Osteopathic Examiners since they came within the statutory provision
authorizing disciplinary action for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude).
77. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, No. 261, 1978 Pa. Laws 1109 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§§ 271.1-.18 (Purdon Supp. 1979)).
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 271.15(aX3) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
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preted in the manner most favorable to the physician. Since the most
restrictive interpretation would be to require the conviction to be con-
sidered a felony under Pennsylvania law, a physician should not be
subject to discipline for a conviction of medicare fraud under the section
of the Medical Practice Act which refers to felonies. To interpret the
term "felony" otherwise would mean that a physician convicted in a
Pennsylvania court for submitting false statements to a Pennsylvania
agency would not be automatically subject to discipline while a physi-
cian for similar conduct involving a federal agency who was convicted
in federal court would be subject to discipline. Such an incongruity
would not appear to be in conformity with the penal nature of
disciplinary actions.
Other jurisdictions have interpreted the term "felony" with varying
results. Those jurisdictions which have held the term "felony" to in-
clude conduct or convictions which would not have amounted to a
felony within the particular state in question have based their broad
interpretation upon the purpose of the licensing act, which is seen as
being primarily the protection of the public-thus using a liberal con-
struction.79 In cases where the doctrine of strict construction was held
to be applicable, the term "felony" was interpreted to mean that the
conviction in the other state, territory or country had to amount to a
felony under the law of the particular state which was imposing the
disciplinary sanction." Since Pennsylvania has provided for strict con-
79. See Bruni v. Department of Registration & Educ., 59 Ill. 2d 6, 319 N.E.2d 37
(1974), cerL denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975) (on basis of legislature's subsequent acts held
"felony" as used in Illinois Medical Practice Act included federal felonies whether or not
those felonies would amount to state felonies); In re Minner, 133 Kan. 789, 3 P.2d 473
(1931) (attorney properly disbarred for conviction of federal felony since state statute ex-
tended to federal felonies as well as state felonies); State v. Estes, 130 Tex. 425, 109
S.W.2d 167 (1937) (primary object of law providing for disbarment of attorney upon con-
viction of felony was to protect public and thus term "felony" was not restricted to state
feloniesbut rather included federal felonies). Cf. State ex reL Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68,
256 N.W. 377 (1934) (governor properly removed from office for conviction of federal
felony which would have amounted to only a misdemeanor under state law; term "felony"
included federal felony since purpose was to protect the public and not to punish the in-
dividual); State ex tel. Beckman v. Bowman, 38 Ohio App. 237, '175 N.E. 891 (1930)
(policeman lost pension because of conviction of federal felony; term "felony" construed
under law of jurisdiction where committed).
80. See note 62 supra. See also Merritt v. Jones, 259 Ark. 380, 533 S.W.2d 497 (1976)
(looked to state definition of "felony" to determine whether conviction of federal felony
came within state statute which authorized removal of individual's name from voter
registration list for conviction of felony); In re Weathers, 159 Fla. 390, 31 So. 2d 543 (1947)
(statutory law authorizing disciplinary action against physician expressly provided that
foreign felony conviction, to be actionable, must have amounted to state felony); In re
Cohen's Will, 254 App. Div. 571, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 764, affd, 278 N.Y. 584, 16 N.E.2d 111 (1938)
(foreign felony conviction not sufficient to deny application for letters testamentary).
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struction,' and as long as that strict construction doctrine continues to
be applicable, the term "felony" in the Medical Practice Act arguably
would be interpreted to include only convictions which would have
amounted to felonies under Pennsylvania law. Thus, a conviction for
medicare fraud possibly may not subject a physician to sanctioning
under the section of the Medical Practice Act which authorizes
disciplinary sanctions for the conviction of a felony.
A question might be asked as to why the interest of the physician
should outweigh the interest of the public when deciding whether a
conviction of a federal felony should automatically subject the physi-
cian to a disciplinary proceeding. In other words, why should not the
public interest have predominance? Is the public being harmed by
allowing physicians who have been convicted of federal felonies to con-
tinue freely to practice medicine? It is important to acknowledge that
the protection of the public is directed by the legislature through the
exercise of its police power in the enactment of statutes.
The Pennsylvania legislature specifically provided only that the con-
viction of felonies-not all crimes or even crimes involving moral tur-
pitude-would subject a physician to a disciplinary action. The
legislature, although making sanctionable only the conviction of
felonies, at the same time expressly provided that other kinds of con-
duct linked to the practice of medicine would be santionable.
Therefore, the legislature protected the public interest by providing
that when the conduct underlying a conviction of a non-felony crime is
seen as harmful to the public the physician will be subjected to the
disciplinary process. For example, if a physician were convicted in a
Pennsylvania court of indecent assault" arising from conduct which oc-
81. Schireson v. Shafer, 354 Pa. 458, 47 A.2d 665 (1946); Catena v. Commonwealth,
411 A.2d 869, 872 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) ("The Act is penal in nature and must be strictly
construed").
82. Section 3126 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides:
A person who has indecent contact with another not his spouse, or causes such
other to have indecent contact with him is guilty of indecent assault, a misde-
meanor of the second degree, if:
(1) He does so without the consent of the other person;
(2) He knows that the other person suffers from a mental disease or defect which
renders him or her incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct;
(3) He knows that the other person is unaware that an indecent contact is being com-
mitted;
(4) He has substantially impaired the other person's power to appraise or control
his or her conduct, by administering or employing without the knowledge of the
other drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance; or
(5) The other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institu-
tion and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over him.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
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curred during the examination of a patient, that conviction would be
only a misdemeanor" and would not be directly actionable. The con-
duct, however, would arguably subject the physician to discipline
because it constitutes "unprofessional conduct."" Thus, the legislature
has chosen to protect the public by examining the conduct underlying
certain crimes, rather than by making the mere conviction of such
crimes actionable.
Given the concern over protecting the public expressed in other pro-
visions subjecting physicians to the disciplinary process, it behooves
one to consider whether the conduct which gave rise to the medicare
fraud conviction violates any other provision of the Medical Practice
Act. 5
B. Misleading, Deceptive, Untrue or Fraudulent
Representations
A conviction for medicare fraud in and of itelf probably does not
violate the Medical Practice Act. The conduct underlying the medicare
fraud conviction, however, arguably does violate the act since it may
be categorized as "misleading, deceptive, untrue or fraudulent
representations in the practice of medicine." 8 A criminal conviction
resulting from a verdict of guilt or an admission of guilt may be used
in other proceedings, such as a disciplinary proceeding, to establish the
facts underlying the conviction. 7 Thus, if a physician is convicted of
mail fraud,88 the mail fraud conviction could be used to establish the
fact that the physician had devised a scheme for the obtaining of
money by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or
83. Id.
84. It probably would be classified as one of "'[those breaches of the trust, con-
fidence and reliance, necessarily attendant upon the intimate relationship of physician and
patient, which amount to gross abuses of the standards of professional conduct generally
recognized as essential to the proper practice of medicine and surgery."' Pennsylvania
State Bd. of Medical Educ. & Licensure v. Ferry, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 372, 378, 94 A.2d 121,
124 (1953) (quoting the lower court opinion).
85. See note 27 supra.
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 421.15(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
87. Kravitz Estate, 418 Pa. 319, 211 A.2d 443 (1965) (record of conviction of murder
conclusively barred convicted murderer from relitigating in civil proceedings the question
of murder or guilt or innocence); Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624, cert. denied,
381 U.S. 925 (1965) (record of conviction of extortioner was conclusive evidence of fact of
extortion). The same result does not flow from a conviction arising from a plea of nolo con-
tendere. If the plea of nolo contendere is accompanied by an assertion of innocence, the
facts charged in the indictment are not conclusively established. See State Dental Council
& Examining Bd. v. Friedman, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 546, 367 A.2d 363 (1976).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
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promises. A conviction under the false statements statute89 arguably
would establish the fact that a physician had knowingly and willfully
made false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations. Such
conduct involving schemes to obtain money by false pretenses or the
making of fraudulent representations would violate the Medical Prac-
tice Act if it involves the practice of medicine." The primary problem,
therefore, is to determine whether the conduct involved in medicare
fraud, the sending of fraudulent bills for medical services to third-
party payors, involves the practice of medicine.
Important to this inquiry is whether the "practice of medicine" en-
tails all aspects of a physician's professional conduct or only the in-
timate, direct relations between a physician and his patient. The
resolution of that question is somewhat easier in jurisdictions which
have liberally interpreted their statutes. It is a difficult issue in Penn-
sylvania since the language of the disciplinary statute must be strictly
construed in favor of the physician." The act, however, even using
strict construction, cannot be interpreted in a way which would defeat
its purpose."
Physicians have recognized that the practice of medicine entails a
physician's billing practices. For example, the Principles of Medical
Ethics refer to the professional responsibilities of a physician with
respect to billing:
In the practice of medicine a physician should limit the source of his pro-
fessional income to medical services actually rendered by him, or under
his supervision, to his patients. His fee should be commensurate with the
services rendered and the patient's ability to pay. He should neither pay
nor receive a commission for referral of patients."
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
90. The section in question specifically links the fraudulent representations with the
practice of medicine. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 421.15(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
91. Shireson v. Shafer, 354 Pa. 548, 47 A.2d 665 (1946); Catena v. Commonwealth, 411
A.2d 869 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980).
92. See Commonwealth v. Byrd, 64 Pa. Super. Ct. 108 (1916), wherein a chiropractor
was held to be practicing medicine without a license. In interpreting the language of the
Medical Practice Act, the court stated:
The intention of the legislature must govern in the construction of penal as well as
other statutes. Though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be
construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The maxim
is not to be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of
cases which those words, in their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which
the legislature has obviously used them would comprehend.
Id. at 113.
93. AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 7 (1959). It should be emphasized that the
Principles of Medical Ethics are not binding in the sense of being laws but that they do
constitute standards to which physicians should adhere:
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Thus, a physician would violate the Principles of Medical Ethics by
submitting false statements for fees to third-party payors since he
would receive income for medical services not rendered by him.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, in Catena v. Com-
monwealth,94 considered the issue of whether third-party billing prac-
tices are included in the practice of medicine and held that they were."5
These principles are intended to aid physicians individually and collectively in main-
taining a high level of ethical conduct. They are not laws but standards by which a
physician may determine the propriety of his conduct in his relationship with pa-
tients, with colleagues, with members of allied professions, and with the public.
AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, preamble (1959).
94. 411 A.2d 869 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980).
95. Cases from jurisdictions referred to by the court in Catena are from jurisdic-
tions which liberally construe their medical practice acts and, therefore, may not be en-
tirely applicable when determining what is "the practice of medicine" in a jurisdiction like
Pennsylvania, which strictly construes its acts. For example, in Matanky v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 79 Cal. App. 3d 293, 144 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1978), a physician who had
been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) by reason of billing for medical services he
did not provide, argued, inter alia, that such conduct was not sanctionable since it did not
relate to the practice of medicine. The court held that the conduct need not necessarily
relate to the practice of medicine since the act is not penal. Moreover, in the court's view,
even if required to come within the practice of medicine, such conduct was related to the
physician's activities. 79 Cal. App. 3d at 306, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 835. In another decision
cited by the Catena court, Kaplan v. Department of Registration & Educ., 46 Ill. App. 3d
968, 361 N.E.2d 626 (1977), a physician, who had been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1976) because of preparing fraudulent medical reports which he sent to insurance com-
panies, contended that there was no connection between the conviction and the purpose of
the medical practice act. The Illinois court noted that a proceeding under the medical
practice act is not a criminal proceeding, and that the purpose of that statute is to main-
tain sound professional standards. Moreover, such conduct constituted an act of fraud or
deceit in the practice of medicine. 46 Ill. App. 3d 975, 361 N.E.2d at 631. The third case
cited in Catena was Wassermann v. Board of Regents, 11 N.Y.2d 173, 182 N.E.2d 264, 227
N.Y.S.2d 649, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 23 (1962). In that case, the submission of false
and exaggerated medical reports for use in settling personal injury cases was found to be
fraud or deceit in the practice of medicine. Id. at 178, 182 N.E.2d at 266, 227 N.Y.S. 2d at
652. The term "practice of medicine" was not limited to direct patient contact. In con-
sidering the Wassermann decision, however, it should be noted that New York em-
phasizes the public interest, see note 62, supra, and has consistently followed the Wasser-
mann rationale, see, e.g., Holmstrand v. Board of Regents, 419 N.Y.S.2d 223 (App. Div.
1979); Dilluvio v. Board of Regents, 60 App. Div. 2d 699. 400 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1977); D'Alois
v. Allen, 31 App. Div. 2d 983, 297 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1969); Glashow v. Allen, 27 App. Div. 2d
625, 275 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1966).
Massachusetts, a state which liberally construes its medical practice act, has also
decided that the fraudulent billing of third-party payors is conduct related to the practice
of medicine. In Levy v. Board of Registration & Discipline in Medicine, 392 N.E.2d 1036
(Mass. 1979), the court upheld the revocation of a physician's license based on his convic-
tion of a crime arising out of improper billings to the state-a third-party payor. The
court stated:
Even if we accept [the physician's] premise that the Board lacked jurisdiction to
discipline a physician for crimes unrelated to the practice of medicine (which we do
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The court noted that to hold otherwise would be to subject physicians
to a lesser professional standard than dentists, which would be il-
logical." Additionally, the court examined prior case law which re-
quired that a physician's conduct must involve the doctor-patient rela-
tionship before the imposition of sanctions would be justified. The
Catena court concluded that those decisions were inapplicable because
the provision under consideration in those cases had been "grossly
unethical conduct" and not fraud or misrepresentations in the practice
of medicine.' The Medical Practice Acts discussed in the prior deci-
sions also contained other grounds for discipline. Thus, the earlier deci-
sions could not be read to exclude from scrutiny all conduct outside
the doctor-patient relationship.
Additionally, third-party billing practices of physicians arguably do
relate to the doctor-patient relationship. Patients who pay for in-
surance or whose employers pay for insurance provided by third-party
payors, or patients whose tax dollars provide for the coverage of in-
dividuals under federal programs are affected since fraudulent billing
practices increase the cost of insurance or taxes paid by or on behalf of
patients." Furthermore, the government or third-party payor only
not), [the physician's] claim still fails . . . . [Tihe crimes are closely related to the
practice of medicine ....
The practice of modern medicine involves financial management as well as the
care and treatment of patients. A substantial portion of persons seeking medical
assistance are assured that a portion of their costs will be paid by a third party ....
Therefore, an intentional misdeed relating to third-party payors reflects adversely
on a physician's fitness to practice medicine. It is irrelevant thai it is a third party,
and not a patient, who is being defrauded.
Id. at 1040-41.
96. Dentists are subject to disciplinary sanctions if they are guilty "of fraudulent or
unlawful practices, or fraudulent, misleading or deceptive representations .... ." PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 122(i) (Purdon 1968). The difference between the provision affecting
dentists and that affecting physicians is that the dental provision does not specifically re-
quire the representation to be in the practice of the profession. See Moses v. Com-
monwealth, 42 Pa. Commw. Ct. 105, 400 A.2d 664 (1979) (submission of false claims to an
insurance company subjected a dentist to disciplinary action since they were misleading
or deceptive representations); Miller v. Commonwealth, 39 Pa. Commw. Ct. 613, 396 A.2d
83 (1979) (false claim reports filed by dentist with a third-party payor were fraudulent or
unlawful practices, or fraudulent, misleading or deceptive representations).
97. State Bd. of Osteopathic Examiners v. Berberian, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 533, 190
A.2d 330 (1963); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Medical Educ. & Licensure v. Ferry, 172 Pa.
Super. Ct. 372, 94 A.2d 121 (1953).
98. See Miller v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 613, 396 A.2d 83 (1979), which
concerned false claims filed by dentists with insurer. The court stated that the State Den-
tal Council "was not dealing with unprofessional conduct alone but rather with fraudulent
practices and fraudulent, misleading or deceptive representations. Certainly, every Penn-
sylvania citizen who is a subscriber to Pennsylvania Blue Shield benefits has an interest
which must be protected by the Council under the authority of the Law." Id. at 621, 396
A.2d at 88.
Duquesne Law Review
pays the physician because of the physician's professional status and
rendering of medical services." To permit a physician to abuse his
license by making false representations in order to obtain income could
well contravene a primary purpose of the act, which is to protect the
public by having only competent, moral persons minister to their
medical needs. 10
C. Immoral or Unprofessional Conduct
The conviction of a physician for medicare fraud also potentially
violates the provision of the Medical Practice Act which makes a physi-
cian's license sanctionable if he is "guilty of immoral or unprofessional
conduct." ' Unprofessional conduct is defined statutorily to "include
any departure from, or the failure to confrom to, the standards of ac-
ceptable and prevailing medical practice, in which proceeding actual in-
jury to a patient need not be established."' 2 One objection to this pro-
vision of the Medical Practice Act is that the term "unprofessional con-
duct" is too broad and accordingly, it would be inappropriate for the
state, on an ad hoc basis, to determine that the billing practices of a
physician might constitute unprofessional conduct."'
99. Cf Matanky v. Board of Medical Examiners, 79 Cal. App. 3d 293, 144 Cal. Rptr.
826 (1978) (involving a state in which a liberal construction was applicable). The Matanky
court ruled, however, that even if the liberal construction were not applicable, medicare
fraud was within the practice of medicine:
Further, in this case the conduct upon which [the physician] was convicted was
related to professional activities. If he had charged a patient for services not actual-
ly rendered, there could be no question that such conduct was related to medical
practice. We see no distinction in fact that he attempted to defraud the federal
government. Though it was not a patient, the federal government, who paid the
bills, was nonetheless a "client" in the professional practice of [the physician]. He
also defrauded the patient for the federal government only pays on behalf of the pa-
tient.
Id. at 306, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 421.6(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979), sets out the qualifications
necessary to obtain a license. That section requires an applicant to furnish evidence that
he "is of legal age, is of good moral character, and is not addicted to the intemperate use
of alcohol or the habitual use of narcotics or other habit-forming drugs, and that he has
completed the educational requirements prescribed by the board." Id
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 421.15(a)(8) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
102. Id
103. In Tuma v. Board of Nursing, 100 Idaho 74, 593 P.2d 711 (1979), the court held a
nurse's license was suspended improperly under statutory provision authorizing
disciplinary action for "unprofessional conduct" since there were no rules or regulations
establishing that the conduct in question was improper. The court noted there cannot be
an after-the-fact determination of whether certain conduct is unprofessional. To be ac-
tionable, it must be a clear case of a serious offense.
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A number of decisions which considered similar issues recognized
that the use of a term such as "unprofessional conduct" was necessary
because it would be impossible to set out explicitly in the statute all
the kinds of activities the state may find objectionable."' In addition,
unprofessional conduct is related to the ever-changing standards of ac-
ceptable and prevailing medical practice; if a broad term such as "pro-
fessional conduct" were not used, every change in the standards would
require an amendment to the statute-a time-consuming and perhaps
impossible proposition. The use of standards prevalent at a given time
should not be offensive to physicians who may be concerned with
determining the parameters of professional conduct, as long as there is
evidence in the disciplinary proceeding which would support a finding
that practitioners in the community in which the physician practices
recognize that the conduct in question, such as fraudulent billing prac-
tices, does in fact violate a standard of acceptable and prevailing
medical practice." 5
Since the statutory definition of "unprofessional conduct" refers to
the standards of acceptable and prevailing medical practice, it requires
that the conduct be related to the practice of medicine. It is therefore
appropriate to question, as in the previous section, whether conduct
sanctionable under that provision must be related to activities directly
occurring between a physician and a patient, or whether it may relate
to activities occurring between a physician and a third-party payor
which indirectly affect the physician's patients and the public. As
discussed earlier, it arguably would defeat a purpose of a Medical
Practice Act to conclude that the billing practices of a physician are
not part of the practice of medicine.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, however, in Catena v.
Commonwealth' rejected the argument that "unprofessional conduct"
104. See Forman v. State Bd. of Health, 157 Ky. 123, 162 S.W. 796 (1914) (construed
statute authorizing disciplinary action for "grossly unprofessional or dishonorable
conduct" to be definite by requiring the conduct to be fraudulent and to involve moral tur-
pitude); Reyburn v. Minnesota State Bd. of Optometry, 247 Minn. 520, 525, 78 N.W.2d 351,
355 (1956) ("It is also the majority rule that a statute empowering a regulatory board to
revoke the license of a physician, surgeon, or dentist for unprofessional conduct is not
void for uncertainty and indefiniteness because it states the grounds for the revocation of
the license in general terms and fails to specify what particular acts or omissions con-
stitute unprofessional conduct"); Board of Medical Examiners v. Mintz, 233 Or. 441, 448,
378 P.2d 945, 948 (1963) ("The fact that it is impossible to catalogue all of the types of pro-
fessional misconduct is the very reason for setting up the statutory standard in broad
terms and delegating to the board the function of evaluating the conduct in each case").
105. See Pennsylvania State Bd. of Medical Educ. & Licensure v. Ferry, 172 Pa.
Super. Ct. 372, 94 A.2d 121 (1953) (unprofessional conduct is determined on particular
facts of each case and the standard is determined by similar practitioners in the same
locale).
106. 411 A.2d 869 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980).
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encompassed all conduct related to the professional aspects of a
physician's life. The court noted that although other disciplinary provi-
sions of the Medical Practice Act may encompass all aspects of profes-
sional conduct, not all the provisions do. The court held that the term
"unprofessional conduct" is statutorily defined and is:
concerned with competence in the art of healing and, in contrast with [the
provision on misleading, deceptive, untrue or fraudulent representations],
seems limited to the doctor-patient relationship. [The provision concerning
'unprofessional conduct'] is the only subsection ...that relates to com-
petence and is clearly not meant to be a catch-all phrase."°
Since the court found that the conduct underlying a medicare fraud
conviction did not occur directly between a doctor and a patient, it was
not "unprofessional conduct" within the meaning of the Medical Prac-
tice Act.' 8 In a concurring opinion, Judge Mencer argued that the
statutory definition refers to the standards of acceptable medical prac-
tice and that medicare fraud would not be classified as an acceptable
practice. "The practice of medicine certainly encompasses more than
107. 1I at 872. But cf. Boehm v. North Carolina Bd. of Podiatry Examiners, 41 N.C.
App. 567, 255 S.E.2d 328 (1979) (filing of claims with State Blue Cross and Blue Shield for
services not performed constitutes immoral or unprofessional conduct).
108. See Lester v. Department of Professional & Occupational Regs., 348 So. 2d 923
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (applying the rule of strict construction, court held physician's
receipt of kickbacks from a hospital was not unprofessional conduct). Given the interpreta-
tion of the term "unprofessional conduct," the following regulations of the State Board of
Medical Education & Licensure are apparently invalid insofar as they define "unprofes-
sional conduct" by reference to conduct not directly involving the doctor-patient relation-
ship:
The term unprofessional conduct shall include, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) Misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact in obtaining a license to
practice medicine or a reinstatement thereof.
(2) Commission of an offense against any provision of the laws of the Com-
monwealth relating to the practice of medicine or any rule or regulation adopted
thereunder.
(3) The commission of any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corrup-
tion when such act directly or indirectly affects the health, welfare, or safety of
citizens of the Commonwealth. If the act constitutes a crime, conviction thereof in a
criminal proceeding shall not be a condition precedent to disciplinary action.
(4) Conviction of a felony, defined as such under the laws of the Commonwealth,
or under the laws of any other state, territory, or country.
(5) All advertising of medical business which is intended or has a tendency to
deceive the public.
(13) Gross, willful, and continued overcharging for professional services including
payments by all third-party payors.
(14) Violation of any Board provision of this chapter fixing a standard of profes-
sional conduct.
Grounds for Complaints, 49 Pa. Code § 17.251(a) (1979). See discussion at note 74 supra.
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mere technical skill.""' Additionally, Judge Mencer stated that the con-
duct underlying a medicare fraud conviction is immoral"' and therefore
within the proscription of the act since the act addresses both immoral
as well as unprofessional conduct. An examination of the points raised
in the concurring opinion establishes their validity.
Prior Pennsylvania decisions defined the term "unprofessional con-
duct" to mean "those breaches of the trust, confidence and reliance,
necessarily attendant upon the intimate relationship of physician and
patient which amount to gross abuses of the standards of professional
conduct generally accepted as essential to the proper practice of
medicine and surgery.'' The standards of professional conduct refer-
red to are those of the physicians practicing in the same community."'
Thus, if the current standards of acceptable and prevailing medical
practice would encompass the billing practices of physicians, the sub-
mission of fraudulent bills to third-party payors arguably would in-
volve a breach of the standards and would therefore constitute un-
professional conduct. Other jurisdictions which have considered the
problem of fraudulent billing, even in the absence of statutory law or
regulations defining the term "unprofessional conduct" to include
fraudulent billing practices, have decided that fraudulent billing prac-
tices with respect to third-party payors are "so obviously wrong and
violative of the standards of ethics expected of a physician that they
constituted 'unprofessional conduct.' ""
3
Moreover, the provision of the Medical Practice Act in question en-
compasses immoral as well as unprofessional conduct."' The term "im-
109. 411 A.2d at 874 (Mencer, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 873-74 (Mencer, J., concurring). Cf. Forziati v. Board of Registration in
Medicine, 333 Mass. 125, 128 N.E.2d 789 (1955) (fee-splitting arrangements with attorney
were in conflict with physician's moral obligations); Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts v.
Seasholtz, 210 Kan. 694, 504 P.2d 576 (1972) (osteopath's filing of false claims for medical
services constituted immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct).
111. State Bd. of Osteopathic Examiners v. Berberian, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 533, 536, 190
A.2d 330, 332 (1963); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Medical Educ. & Licensure v. Ferry, 172
Pa. Super Ct. 372, 378, 94 A.2d 121, 124 (1953).
112. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Medical Educ. & Licensure v. Ferry, 172 Pa. Super. Ct.
372, 94 A.2d 121 (1953).
113. See Wassermann v. Board of Regents, 11 N.Y.2d 173, 182 N.E.2d 264, 227
N.Y.S.2d 649 (1962) (distinguished by the majority in Catena because of the differences in
the way New York statutorily provided for "unprofessional conduct"). See also In re
Shigon, 462 Pa. 1, 329 A.2d 235 (1974), where the court, in a disciplinary proceeding
brought against lawyers based upon, inter alia, the submission of fraudulent and inflated
medical claims, quoted from the lower court as follows: "'This case presents a melancholy
record of unprofessional conduct on the part of doctors, as well as unprofessional conduct
on the part of lawyers, in violation of the Code of Ethics governing both professions."' Id
at 20-21, 329 A.2d at 245.
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 421.15(aX8) (Purdon Supp. 1979) ("Being guilty of immoral
or unprofessional conduct"). In Lawrence v. Briry, 239 Mass. 424, 132 N.E. 174 (1921), the
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moral conduct" relates to the moral character of an individual."5'
Arguably, one who engages in immoral conduct lacks good moral
character. The term "good moral character" is important since an ap-
plicant for a license must certify that he is of good moral character and
may be denied a license if he lacks the requisite character."'
"Good moral character" is a term which has been given a restrictive
meaning in cases involving licensing problems. It is not ambiguous. In
Konigsberg v. State Bar"7 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered an issue of whether an applicant for admission to the bar in
California had been unconstitutionally denied his certification to prac-
tice law on the ground, inter alia, that he was not of good moral
character. The Court, in considering what was encompassed in good
moral character, reviewed California decisions in which "good moral
character" had been defined to include the absence of any conduct
which manifested "moral turpitude.""' The applicant's conduct under
examination in Konigsberg involved unorthodox political beliefs or
membership in a political party. That conduct did not manifest "moral
turpitude" and it was therefore improper for the bar admission
authorities to conclude that the applicant lacked good moral character.
court commented on why the state legitimately may be concerned with a physician's
morals:
Soundness of moral fiber to insure the proper use of medical learning is as essential
to the public health as medical learning itself. Mere intellectual power and scientific
achievement without uprightness of character may be more harmful than ignorance.
Highly trained intelligence combined with disregard of the fundamental virtues is a
menace.
Id at 429, 132 N.E. at 176. See Forziati v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 333 Mass.
125, 128 N.E.2d 789 (1955). See also AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 4 (1959) ("The
medical profession should safeguard the public and itself against physicians deficient in
moral character or professional competence").
115. Immoral is defined as "contrary to good morals." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 885
(rev. 4th ed. 1968).
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 421.6(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979). In contrast, the provision
applicable to attorneys with respect to character presumes good character:
The general requirements for admission to the bar of this Commonwealth are:
(3) Absence of prior conduct by the applicant which in the opinion of the Board in-
dicates character and general qualifications (other than scholastic) incompatible
with the standard expected to be observed by members of the bar of this Com-
monwealth.
PA. BAR. ADMISSION R. 203. The attorney provision is in keeping with the United States
Supreme Court decisions concerning moral character. Id (explanatory note).
117. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
118. Id. at 263 ("These cases ... appear to define 'good moral character' in terms of an
absence of proven conduct or acts which have been historically considered as manifesta-
tions of 'moral turpitude' ").
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In another case involving an attorney, the California Supreme Court
held that a California law permitted the disciplining of an attorney
upon proof that he had been convicted of a crime involving moral tur-
pitude or had committed an act involving moral turpitude."9 The court
recognized that the concept of moral turpitude varies depending upon
the community and the time in which the conduct is brought into ques-
tion. Criminal activity which involves an intent to defraud or pur-
poseful deceit in order to attain personal gain was seen as involving
moral turpitude. In the particular case in question, a conviction based
upon the failure to file income tax returns without an additional show-
ing of an intent to defraud or an intent to improperly secure personal
gain did not amount to the conviction of a crime involving moral tur-
pitude-even though that kind of conduct lowered the reputation of
lawyers in the community.'"
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has determined that
medicare fraud convictions involve moral turpitude.21 In a case involv-
ing the appropriateness of revoking an osteopath's license the court
held that a plea of guilty to crimes involving medicare fraud con-
stituted the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." The
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania recognized that the professional
119. In re Fahey, 8 Cal. 3d 842, 505 P.2d 1369, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1973) (resolved all
reasonable doubts in favor of attorney in determining whether crime or act involved
moral turpitude). See Bartos v. United States Dist. Court, 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1927) (at-
torney could not be disbarred for conviction based on his making beer for personal use
since it was not crime of moral turpitude); Hummel v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners,
103 Colo. 476, 87 P.2d 248 (1939) (since term "immoral conduct" was used with reference
to term "unprofessional conduct" the immoral conduct, to be actionable, had to be related
to the practice of the profession); In re Weisensee, 88 S.D. 544, 224 N.W.2d 830 (1975)
(followed Fahey analysis in a disciplinary action brought against an attorney).
120. 8 Cal. 3d at 853, 505 P.2d at 1376, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 320 ("Offenses that do not in-
volve moral turpitude or affect professional performance should not be a basis for profes-
sional discipline simply because they fall short of the highest standards of professional
ethics or may in some way impair the public image of the profession").
121. Yurick v. Commonwealth, 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 248, 402 A.2d 290 (1979) (osteo-
path's license revoked for conviction of crime involving moral turpitude- 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1976) (mail fraud)); Goodman v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. Commw. Ct. 380, 400 A.2d 939
(1979) (osteopath's license revoked for conviction of crime involving moral turpitude- 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) (false statements)); State Dental Council & Examining Bd. v. Fried-
man, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 546, 367 A.2d 363 (1976) (dentist's license suspended for convic-
tion of crime involving moral turpitude- mail fraud). See Carey v. Board of Medical Ex-
aminers, 66 Cal. App. 3d 538, 136 Cal Rptr. 91 (1977) (podiatrist was subject to
disciplinary sanctions for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude- 18 U.S.C. §
1001 (1976) (false statements)).
122. Yurick v. Commonwealth, 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 248, 402 A.2d 290 (1979) (osteopathic
law provided for discipline upon "conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude").
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licensing board was a "watch dog" entrusted by the commonwealth to in-
sure that the high standards which the public expects of osteopaths are
maintained. Since a conviction resulting from fraudulent billing prac-
tices constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, the court upheld
the revocation of the osteopath's license.
By direct inference, therefore, the conduct of submitting fraudulent
bills for payment to third-party payors by physicians involves moral
turpitude and a physician should reasonably be expected to know that
such conduct is "immoral." Furthermore, since such conduct arguably
is related to the practice of medicine, the physician should know that
'he engaged in immoral or unprofessional conduct in violation of the
Medical Practice Act.
CONCLUSION
This discussion illustrates that there are serious questions raised
when a physician is involved in a disciplinary proceeding because of
prior medicare fraud convictions. Hopefully, physicians and attorneys
will be alerted that the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or
a conviction following a trial for medicare fraud will not only subject
the physician to criminal sanctions but will impact upon his continued
ability to practice medicine.12
The potential arguments concerning the interpretation of the terms
"felony," "in the practice of medicine," and "immoral or unprofessional
conduct" are issues which the Pennsylvania courts will be facing. In
that regard it might be advisable for the legislature, particularly with
respect to whether physicians are subject to discipline for convictions
of federal felonies which would not amount to felonies under Penn-
sylvania law, to clarify the statutory language so that the sensitive
issues discussed in this article need not be raised in disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Additionally, since the statutory provisions regulating the
various health care professions such as dentistry, osteopathy and medi-
cine differ, it might be pertinent to examine the differences, and if the
differences are not reasonable, to enact some uniform standards with
respect to such professionals. 4
123. In a few disciplinary proceedings conducted by the author sitting as a hearing ex-
aminer for the State Board of Medical Education and Licensure, the physicians involved
stated they were alarmed when they learned that their pleas of guilty or nolo contendere
caused the state to initiate disciplinary proceedings against them.
124. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6509 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1979) (applies to physi-
cians, chiropractors, dentists, podiatrists, etc.); Va. Code §§ 54-316 to -317 (Supp. 1979) (ap-
plies to physicians, osteopaths, chiropractors, podiatrists, etc.).
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